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The Road to Booker
Slouching Toward Booker and Beyond-The Court
Embraces and Rejects the Role of Juries at Sentencing
Diane E. Courselle*
A great irony of the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Booker' is that while the Court found on the merits that sentencing pursuant to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines2 ("Guidelines") violated a defendant's
right to a trial by jury,' the Court crafted a remedy that did nothing to protect or
vindicate the jury trial right. Booker was decided at a time when juries were
increasingly scrutinized and criticized5 and was not the first time members of the
Court demonstrated ambivalence toward juries. This article will explore the
Court's reluctance to countenance a greater role for juries in the sentencing
process.
One simple explanation for the conflicting position taken by the Court is that
the judgment in Booker is based on two five to four opinions with very different
compositions of the respective majorities. Four of the five Justices who crafted
*

Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law; J.D., Loyola Law School (New Orleans); B.A.,

Fordham University.
1. 435 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3661 (1984).
3. Booker, 435 U.S. at 244.
4. Id. at 247-48 (Breyer, J., delivering the majority opinion in Part II); id. at 288 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part). Whether the Court's remedy to selectively excise portions of the Sentencing Reform Act was justifiable
or proper has been a source of considerable dispute both among the Justices themselves and among
commentators. See also id. at 270-302 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 303-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting in
part); id. at 313-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). This article examines the implications of the remedy on the
continued respect for the jury trial right and therefore, the debate about the Court's severability analysis is
beyond its scope.
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, WE, THE JURY (2000); Diane E. Courselle, Struggling With Deliberative
Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 204-08 (2005); Tom M. Dees, Juries: On
the Verge of Extinction? A Discussion of Jury Reform, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 1755 (2001); Steven I. Friedland, The
Competency and Responsibility ofJurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 200-04 (1990); Graham C.
Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53 (2001); Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the
Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 909-14 (2003); Eugene R. Sullivan
& Akhil R. Amar, Jury Reform in America-A Return to the Old Country, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1141, 1141
(1996); Neil Vidmar, The Performanceof the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective,40 ARIz. L. REV.
850, 850 (1998) ("Juries have been said, variously, to be incompetent, capricious, unreliable, biased, sympathyprone, confused, hostile to corporate defendants and doctors, gullible, excessively generous in awarding
compensatory damages, and out of control when awarding punitive damages."). In addition, the National Center
for State Courts has created a Center for Jury Studies with the goal of helping states "expand juror participation
and service, improve jury management operations, and improve juror comprehension." See John H. Pickering,
Reforming the Civil Judicial System... The National Centerfor State Courts, 28 MONT. LAW. 20 (2002). The
American Bar Association joined the movement and in February 2005 it adopted the "ABA Principles Relating
to Juries and Jury Trials." AMERICAN BAR ASSOcIATION, PRINCIPALS FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, available
at http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandardslprinciples.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2005) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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the remedy dissented from the conclusion that there had been a legal error at all.6
But that does not tell the full story. Even before Booker, the application of the
right to a jury trial for sentencing issues was a source of considerable
controversy.
I. THE ROAD TO BOOKER
The road to Booker is paved with cases that demonstrate an ongoing
controversy within the Court about the extent to which the jury trial right, and the
abilities of jurors, should be valued. The line of cases that developed the rule
applied on the merits in Booker begins with Jones v. United States Jones
decided an issue regarding statutory construction of the federal carjacking
statute--whether the statute should be read to create multiple distinct offenses or
to create a single offense that carried a different sentence depending on whether
certain additional facts were found by the court.9 Resolving to interpret the statute
as creating multiple offenses, the majority suggested that a contrary interpretation
would run afoul of the right to a jury trial.'° The dissent, however, argued that the
majority had not made clear how or why a different interpretation would
implicate the jury trial right."
Following Jones, the Court more directly confronted the implications of the
jury trial right at sentencing. The Court's new approach began with Apprendi v.
New Jersey'2 and has carried through to Booker. At each step along the way,

6. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Kennedy dissented on the merits. Booker,
435 U.S. at 325-34 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Those same Justices and Justice Ginsberg joined to form the
majority on the issue of remedy. Id. at 244-68 (Breyer, J., delivering the majority opinion in Part II).
7. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
8. Id. at 229. The version of the statute at issue in Jones provided:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle that has
been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence
of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 & Supp. V).
9. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
10. Id. at 240-48. "The point is simply that diminishment of the jury's significance by removing control
over facts determining a statutory sentencing range would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to
raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue not yet settled." Id. at 248.
11. "[T]o bolster its statutory interpretation, the Court raises the specter of 'grave and doubtful
constitutional questions' . . . without an adequate explanation of the origins, contours, or consequences of its
ccnstitutional concerns." Id. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 264-71.
12. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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however, the Court has remained seriously divided regarding the application of
the jury trial right. 3
In Apprendi, the defendant pled guilty to second degree possession of a
firearm for an unlawful purpose based on an incident in which he fired bullets
into the home of an African-American family in a previously all-white
neighborhood; by statute, that second degree possession offense was punishable
by imprisonment for "between five years and 10 years."' New Jersey's "hate
crime law" provided for enhanced punishment "if the trial judge finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that '[t]he defendant in committing the crime
acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because
of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.""15 For
second degree offenses, the hate crime statute authorized increased punishment
of "imprisonment for between 10 and 20 years."' 6 At sentencing, the trial court
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the offense was racially
motivated, and thus the court imposed an enhanced sentence of twelve years
imprisonment.' 7 At the Supreme Court, the majority concluded that the factracial motivation-that increased the maximum authorized punishment had to be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 The Apprendi majority held that
based on principles of due process and the right to trial by jury, any fact that
could increase a defendant's sentence beyond the maximum sentence for the
offense of conviction must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and
with full due process protections.' 9
Jones and Apprendi were decided in the wake of a movement among
legislatures to exert more control over the sentencing process and to increase

13. In Jones, the majority opinion was joined by Justices Souter, Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
See Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-52 (Souter, J., providing the majority opinion); see also id. at 252-53 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Breyer joined in the dissent. Id. at 254-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court was split along those same lines
in Apprendi, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Booker. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-523
(Stevens, J., writing the opinion of the Court); id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 499-523 (Thomas, J.,
concurring (joined in part by Scalia, J.)); id. at 523-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting (joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and
Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.)); id. at 554-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting (joined by Rehnquist, C.J.)); see also Blakely,
542 U.S. at 287-313 (Scalia, J., delivering the opinion of the Court); id. at 313-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting
(joined by Breyer, J., and joined in part by Rehnquist C.J. and Kennedy, J.)); id. at 326-28 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting (joined by Breyer, J.)); id. at 328-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting (joined by O'Connor, J.)). The Court was
similarly split in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), although Justice Kennedy broke from the dissenters and
Justice Breyer also concurred in the judgment of the Court. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-609 (Ginsburg, J.,
providing the opinion of the Court (joined by Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ.)); id. at 610-13
(Scalia, J., concurring (joined by Thomas, J.)); id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 613-19 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 619-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting (joined by Rehnquist, C.J.)).
14. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-70 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
15. Id. at 468-69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000)).
16. Id. at 469 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West 2005)).
17. Id. at 471.
18. Id. at 489.
19. Id.
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sentences by creating "sentencing enhancement" statutes." Under such
"enhancement" schemes, proof of an additional fact (or facts) could lead to a
sentence longer than that authorized for the offense itself.' The Court, then, has
had to confront whether these "enhancing" facts should be treated like elements
of the offense or whether they should be treated like any other sentencing
consideration.22 In other words, if a core function of the right to a jury trial is "the
right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of
'guilty,' 23 what facts need to be proved to reach a finding of "guilty?"
The majority's resolution of this issue in Apprendi has been thoroughly
dissected, analyzed, and criticized since the decision was handed down 4 The
Court's reasoning came from the intersection of the right to a trial by jury25 with
the due process requirement that a defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt: 26 "Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal
defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.' 27 As the Court
previously recognized in Jones, however, what constitutes an "element" of an
offense is not always a straightforward determination."
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,29 the Court "coined the term 'sentencing factor'
to refer to a fact that was not found by a jury but that could affect the sentence

20. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that the past
twelve years had seen an "accelerating propensity of both state and federal legislatures to adopt 'sentencing
factors' determined by judges that increase punishment beyond what is authorized by the jury's verdict..." ).
21. One of the most common statutory grounds for enhanced sentences is recidivism. Despite repeated
assertions of doubt, the Court consistently has held that the fact of a prior conviction need not be proved to a
jury. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). But see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489; id. at
519-21 (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling into question the validity of Almendarez-Torres).
22. The Court was first confronted with this issue in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). In
McMillan, the Court upheld judicial factfinding of "sentencing factors" that would require the imposition of
mandatory minimum sentences. Id. at 86-88. The Court had long permitted judicial determination of other facts
inexercising its discretionary authority to determine what sentence to impose within the statutory range created
by the legislature. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246 (1949) ("[B]oth before and since the American
colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which the sentencing
judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the
kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.").
23. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
24. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional
Command or ConstitutionalBlunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 198-208 (2005); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial FactFindingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1115-23 (2001); M.K.B.
Darmer, The FederalSentencing GuidelinesAfter Blakely and Booker: The Limits of CongressionalTolerance
and a GreaterRole for Juries,56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 545-49 (2005).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (stating the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,361 (1970).
27. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 266, 477 (2000) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,
510 (1995)); see also Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278; Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
28. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
29. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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imposed by the judge." 30 The "sentencing factor" at issue was a judicial
determination that a person who "visibly possessed a firearm" in the cormmission3
of certain felonies would then be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. 1
The Court, though acknowledging that the Constitution places some limits on a
state's authority to define away facts necessary to constitute an offense3 2 and may
limit a state's authority to keep from the jury facts that increase the punishment
to which a defendant is exposed, 3 ' expressed "no doubt that Pennsylvania's
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act falls on the permissible side of the
constitutional line. ' 34 Although in Apprendi the Court claimed to limit, rather
than overrule McMillan," it found labels such as "elements" or "sentencing
factors" were not helpful to the resolution of due process and jury trial claims.36
Instead, what was most important was the "effect" a particular "fact" had on the
range within which the sentencing judge could properly exercise discretion.37
To tie its analysis in Apprendi to the right to a jury trial, the Court looked to
the long-recognized purposes and the historical practices of jury trials to support
its determination regarding what facts must be found by a jury. The American
jury trial right, which extended from centuries of common law practice, was
maintained "to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
rulers. 38 In practice, the jury trial right was "understood to require that 'the truth
of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or
appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of
[the defendant's] equals and neighbors ... .""9 According to the majority's

historical analysis, at common law there was no reason to distinguish between
"elements" and "sentencing factors;" criminal cases began with an indictment
that had to contain detailed allegations of the facts constituting the criminal
offense and substantive crimes generally carried determinate sentences so, once a
particular crime was found to have been committed (a job for the jury), the

30. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485.
31. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81-82.
32. Id. at 85-88.
33. Id. at 88.
34. Id.at91.
35. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n. 13 ("We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a
sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict-a limitation
identified in the McMillan opinion itself.").
36. Id. at 476.
37. Id. at 494. Apprendi did not alter the long-standing general principle that "within statutory limits" for
the offense of conviction, a sentencing judge may exercise considerable discretion-"taking into consideration
various factors relating both to offense and offender." Id. at 481 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
246 (1949)).
38. Id. at 477 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1995) (quoting JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1863))).

39.

Id.(quoting Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510-11 (quoting WILLIAM
343 (1769))).

LAWS OF ENGLAND

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
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sentence was a foregone conclusion.4 0 This "historic link between verdict and
judgment,4"' highlights the critical role juries have played in the criminal process.
Eliminating the jury from determining facts that permit punishment beyond that
provided in the statute that the jury determined the defendant had violated,
diminishes the jury's role at a time when it is critically important-when
"both
4 2
heightened.
are
offense
the
to
attaching
stigma
the
and
liberty
the loss of
The Apprendi majority's description of the historical regard for the right to a
trial by jury is not overstated. The Court previously recognized that "[t]he
essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused
and his accuser of the common sense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the
community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence."4'3 And, the decision to include the right to a
trial by jury in the Bill of Rights was not at all controversial; it "reflect[ed] a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to
entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a
group of judges." The more facts necessary to a determination of "guilt" that are
entrusted to the discretion of a sentencing judge, and not a jury, the greater the
diminution of the sense of community participation and shared responsibility that
should come with the verdict.
The Court's ultimate conclusion in Apprendi was that "[oither than the fact
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. ,4 The holding in Apprendi was then extended in Ring v.
Arizona to require that aggravating facts necessary to impose the death penalty
also must be found by a jury and not a judge.46 The Court even acknowledged
that while judges might be better or more reliable factfinders, that is beside the
point:
Entrusting to a judge the finding of facts necessary to support a death
sentence might be "an admirably fair and efficient scheme of criminal
justice designed for a society that is prepared to leave criminal justice to
the State .... The founders of the American Republic were not prepared
to leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of

40. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478-81. The majority's historical analysis was roundly criticized by the
principle dissenting opinion. See id. at 525-27.
41. Id. at 482.
42. Id. at 484.
43. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
44. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
45. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
46. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). In Arizona, such aggravating factors already were
required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 597.
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the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been
efficient; but it has always been free."47
The Constitution already reflects not just a preference for, but a requirement of a
jury trial.
In support of jury sentencing in capital cases, Justice Breyer, concurring in
the judgment, emphasized the jury's role as the voice of the community; that
community voice, however, was required not by the Sixth Amendment, but by
the Eighth Amendment.4 '8 Breyer notes, in particular, the jury's advantage over
judges in expressing the experiences, sensibilities, and conscience of the
community.49 Moreover, given the lack of consensus about the validity of the
death penalty as currently applied, the jury is better able to translate a particular
community's assessment of whether such punishment is cruel and unusual. °
While expressed in Eighth Amendment terms, Justice Breyer's comments
support the notion that the Apprendi rule (which he rejected)5' reflects and
protects important purposes of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.
The final step in the march toward Booker occurred in Blakely v.
Washington.2 At issue in Blakely were not specific sentencing enhancements, but
Washington's sentencing guidelines, which were intended to make more uniform
the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing within the sentencing limits for
the offense the legislature set.53 Blakely was convicted of second degree
kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm; this offense carried
54
a legislatively authorized sentence of no more than ten years imprisonment.
Washington's sentencing guidelines set the "standard range" sentence for that
offense at forty-nine to fifty-three months,55 but the judge was permitted to
impose a longer sentence upon a finding of "substantial and compelling reasons
justifying an exceptional sentence., 56 Those reasons included certain statutorily
enumerated aggravating factors.57 The trial judge found that Blakely's conduct
reflected at least one of those statutory aggravating factors: "deliberate cruelty"

47. Id. at 607 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
48. Ring, 536 U.S. at 614, 618-19 (Breyer, J. concurring) (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (joint
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
49. Ring, 536 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 616, 618.
51. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555 (dissenting opinion); see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 613-14 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
52. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
53. Id. at 300-05.
54. Id. at 297-300; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.40.030(l),(3), 9.94A.125, 9A.20.021(l)(b),
10. 9 9 .020(3)(p) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006).
55. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300.
56. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2)).
57. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390).

2006/Slouching Toward Booker and Beyond
in a domestic violence case. 8 Thus, Blakely received "an exceptional sentence of
90 months-37 months beyond the standard maximum."'5 9
Somewhere between Apprendi and Blakely there was a subtle shift in the
Court's analysis. In Apprendi, the right to a jury trial was deemed to apply to
"any fact that increases the penalty or a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum. ' '60 The Blakely majority, however, described the "statutory maximum"
not in terms of the outside limit set by the legislature, but as "the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on
'' the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant. 61
Again in Blakely, the Court was divided as to whether the right to a jury trial
truly should apply in such circumstances. 6' The majority found the jury trial right
implicated whenever a judge seeks to impose a sentence not based on facts
necessary to the jury's verdict or admitted by the defendant. 63 The dissent's
primary concern in rejecting the application of the jury trial right in such
circumstances was that requiring a jury determination of those facts that affect
sentencing would be so costly and impractical that legislatures would be more
likely to return to a regime of unfettered judicial sentencing discretion and all the
inequities that discretion may invite.64 But, as the Court has consistently
recognized, even if jury factfinding may be inefficient and burdensome, interests
in convenience and expedience cannot trump the Sixth Amendment's
constitutional command.65
From Blakely, however, it was no big stretch for the same analysis to
implicate the right to a jury trial when applied to the Guidelines. Booker applied
the Blakely analysis and determined that the increase of the defendant's sentence,
based upon additional quantities of drugs deemed "relevant conduct," and the
determination that the defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, neither of which
had been found by the jury, violated the right to a jury trial. 66 Because the Justices
agreed that if the Guidelines were not mandatory the Sixth Amendment
implications could be avoided, 67 a separate majority struck down only those
portions of the Guidelines that made them mandatory. 68 In the companion case,
58. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii)).
59. Id.
60. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The fact of a prior conviction, however, is
excepted from this requirement. Id.
61. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 302-04.
62. Compare id. at 307-08, with id. at 316 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 302-04.
64. Id. at 315-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The development of guidelines sentencing had been a
reaction tosentencing disparities that occurred under more discretionary sentencing regimes. See, e.g., Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L.

REV. 1,4-5 (1988).
65. ld. at 311-14.
66. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-28, 231-33 (2005).
67. Id. at 231-34, 245-47, 258-60.
68. Id. at 243-45; see also infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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United States v. FanFan,the sentencing court followed only those provisions of
the Guidelines that required no additional factfinding that would implicate the
Sixth Amendment.69 The Court found that because FanFan nonetheless was
sentenced by treating as mandatory those portions of the Guidelines that did not
implicate Sixth Amendment concerns, he (and the Government) were entitled to
resentencing. 7° Thus, both majority opinions in Booker/FanFan are rooted, to
some extent, in recognition of the right to a trial by jury.
II. THE COURT'S LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT

Despite the long-established common law roots of the right to a trial by jury
and repeated exaltations of the jury as a critical protector against abusive
government power,7' members of the Court have expressed considerable
ambivalence about juries. For example, in finding that Ring was not retroactive,
the Court recently noted that "for every argument why juries are more accurate
factfinders [than judges], there is another why they are less accurate., 72 The Sixth
Amendment, however, reflects a choice to value the jury-regardless of the
accuracy of verdicts-for the benefits that arise from jury independence, group
decision-making, and community participation in the process. 73
The Court's mistrust of juries has been most pronounced in cases focusing on
jurors' abilities to determine sentences or civil sanctions. For example, it has long
been a centerpiece of capital sentencing jurisprudence that to satisfy due process
and the Eighth Amendment, the jury must evaluate all the relevant circumstances
and characteristics of the defendant, both mitigating and aggravating, when
determining whether to impose a death sentence.74 The Court has held that the
jury must be able to consider mitigating factors such as the defendant's mental
retardation S76and the defendant's youth. In two recent cases, however, the Court
69. Id. at 228-29.
70. Id. at 267-68.
71. See, e.g., supranotes 39-42 and accompanying text; Courselle, supra note 5, at 210-13.
72. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004).
73. Indeed, in numerous other contexts, the Court has protected the jury's role even when it appears
particular juries may have reached unreliable results. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987)
(protecting jurors from inquiry about deliberations, even though evidence suggested that jurors had been
drinking and taking drugs during trial and deliberations); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)
(upholding an inconsistent verdict).
74. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[I]n capital
cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."); see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
75. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-28 (1989).
76. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) ("A central feature of death penalty sentencing is a
particular assessment of the circumstances of the crime and the characteristics of the offender. The system is
designed to consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including youth, in every case."); id. at
572 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "There is no question that 'the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
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removed those factors from the sentencing juries' consideration by finding that
the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibited application of the death penalty
to defendants with mental retardation77 and juvenile defendants under eighteen
years of age." Underlying the majority opinions in these cases, at least in part,
was the concern that juries cannot be trusted to give such matters appropriate
consideration.
For example, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court noted several characteristics of
persons with mental retardation that increased the risk "that the death penalty will be
imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty."79 According to
the majority, the possibility of jurors misapplying evidence related to mental
retardation "can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the
aggravating factor.., will be found by the jury."80 The dissent, however, criticized
this distrust
as both 81unsupported and contradictory to the important role the juries
•
play in such matters.
In Roper v. Simmons, the majority expressed similar distrust of jurors' abilities to
give accurate assessment to a capital defendant's youth. The Court explained:
The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death
penalty despite insufficient culpability. An unacceptable likelihood exists
that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even
where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability,
8 2 and lack
of true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.

mitigating factor of great weight' . . . and sentencing juries must be given an opportunity carefully to consider a
defendant's age and maturity in deciding whether to assess the death penalty." Id. at 606 (quoting Eddings, 455
U.S. at 116).
77. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
78. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
79. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). Those
characteristics included "the possibility of false confessions," "lesser ability ... to make a persuasive showing
of mitigation," lesser ability "to give meaningful assistance to their counsel," poor performance as witnesses,
and "demeanor [that] may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse." Id. at 320-21.
80. Id. at 321 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 (1989)).
81. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia opined:
The second assumption [by the majority]-inability of judges or juries to take proper account of
mental retardation-is not only unsubstantiated, but contradicts the immemorial belief, here and in
England, that they play an indispensable role in such matters: "[I]t is very difficult to define the
indivisible line that divides perfect and partial insanity; but it must rest upon circumstances duly to
be weighed and considered both by the judge and jury, lest on the one side there be a kind of
inhumanity towards the defects of human nature, or on the other side too great an indulgence given
to great crimes."
Id. (quoting I Hale, Pleas of the Crown, at 30).
82. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73.
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Again, the dissenters took the majority to task for the lack of support for its
mistrust of jurors' abilities to handle such information.83 As Justice Scalia
asserted:
The Court concludes... that juries cannot be trusted with the delicate
task of weighing a defendant's youth along with the other mitigating and
aggravating factors of his crime. This startling conclusion undermines
the very foundations of our capital sentencing system, which entrusts
juries with "mak[ing] the difficult and uniquely human judgments that
defy codification and that 'buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a
legal system."' McCleskey [v. Kemp], 481 U.S. 279, 311 ...(1987)
(quoting H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 498 (1966)).
The Court . . . . says that juries will be unable to appreciate the
significance of a defendant's youth when faced with details of a brutal
crime. This assertion is based on no evidence; to the contrary, the Court
itself acknowledges that the execution of under-18 offenders is
"infrequent" even in the States "without a formal prohibition on
executing juveniles," suggesting that juries take seriously their
responsibility to weigh youth as a mitigating factor. 4
These decisions reflect fundamental differences on the Court about the abilities
of jurors to make sound, well-informed judgments.
The Court had an opportunity to fully express those differences when it was
deciding in Schiro whether Ring applied retroactively to convictions that were
final at the time Ring was decided. First, the Court concluded that the Ring rule
was procedural, not substantive; rather than change what findings were necessary
to the imposition of the death penalty, Ring only changed who needed to make
them-the jury, not the judge.8" The Court then tackled the alternative argument
that Ring was retroactive as a "'watershed rule[] of criminal procedure'
implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. 8 6
The majority concluded that while there was much dispute about the relative
merits of juries versus judges as factfinders, judicial factfinding did not "so
'seriously diminish[]' accuracy as to produce an 'impermissibly large risk' of
injustice., 87 The Court also supported this conclusion by noting "the mixed
reception that the right to [a] jury has been given in other countries., 88 The
dissent, on the other hand, suggested that one way in which juries were more
reliable, and indeed necessary in capital sentencing, is not in making the
83. Id. at 587-89, 589-601, 603-08 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 619-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 620-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85. Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004).
86. Id. at 355 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
87. Id. at 355-56 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13) (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 356 (citing Neil Vidmar, The Jury Elsewhere in the World, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 421
(Neil Vidmar ed. 2000)).
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determination that an offense meets the statutory criteria for imposition of the
death penalty, but in making the even more important judgment that the death
penalty is the appropriate punishment in the particular case.89 The dissent's
position was that because the Eighth Amendment requires greater accuracy in
capital cases, and the jury is at the very least more accurate in delivering the
community consensus that a person should receive the death penalty for an
offense, the Ring rule should be deemed to fit Teague's retroactivity exception
for "watershed rules." 9° Thus, regardless of whether the dissenters believe that
juries are more accurate in determining the facts of an offense, the value of the
jury as the voice of the community elevated its role in the contexts of the Sixth
and Eighth Amendments.
Distrust of, or at least ambivalence about, juror competence also is apparent
in the Court's recent decisions regarding civil jury awards of punitive damages. 9'
In those cases, a significant source of dispute was whether jury determinations
should be second-guessed by the Court. In both BMW of North America v. Gore92
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,9' a majority of
the Court found that the juries' determinations of punitive damages violated due
process. In each, the majority rejected some of the juries' underlying
conclusions in support of the awards, 95 but at a most basic level, the majority
opinions reflect a disagreement with the "commonsense judgment" of the jury.96
For one thing, nothing in either opinion suggests that the juries were instructed to
apply the "guideposts" identified and applied by the Court in BMW. The
importance of some system of standards restraining the jury's discretion was
underscored by Justice Breyer in a concurring opinion in BMW:
[A system of standards] has special importance where courts review a
jury-determined punitive damages award. That is because one cannot
expect to direct jurors like legislators through the ballot box; nor can one
expect those jurors to interpret law like judges, who work within a
disciplined and hierarchical organization that normally promotes roughly
uniform interpretation and application of the law. Yet here Alabama
expects jurors to act, at least a little, like legislators or judges, for it
89. Id. at 359-62 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id. at 360-64.
91. Of course, these decisions implicate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, which does not
provide a precise analogue to the history or purposes to the Sixth Amendment right at issue in Booker.
92. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
93. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
94. Id. at 429; BMW, 517 U.S. at 586-87.
95. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-85 (noting indicia of reasonableness for punitive damage awards
and holding the jury's implicit findings unsupported); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418-29 (evaluating jury award in
light of BMW guideposts and finding award not reasonably supported).
96. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 430-31 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Neither the amount of the award nor
the trial record, however, justifies this Court's substitution of its judgment for that of Utah's competent
decisionmakers."); BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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permits them, to a certain extent, to create public policy and to apply that
policy, not to compensate a victim, but to achieve a policy-related
objective outside the confines of the particular case.97
By evaluating the jury's determination in light of standards of which the jury was
never apprised, however, the majority discounts the role the civil jury is asked to
perform when awarding punitive damages. Indeed, a civil jury awarding punitive
damages plays a role much like a criminal jury in a capital case determining
punishment. As Justice Scalia explained, "[a]t the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it was well understood that punitive damages represent
the assessment of the jury, as the voice of the community, of the measure of
punishment the defendant deserves. 98 Thus, the degree of mistrust of a jury's
ability to make sound judgments in inflammatory civil cases is akin to the
unwillingness to permit jurors to make judgments in criminal sentencing.
Doubts about jurors' competence and abilities have also driven much of the
jury reform movement. Among the concerns underlying jury reform are whether
jurors adequately understand the evidence and jury instructions and whether
jurors are too easily and frequently misled.99 Thus, various reform movements
have permitted juror notetaking, juror questions being presented to witnesses,
pre-deliberation discussions, and reopening arguments (or the evidence) when
jurors become deadlocked; other reforms have focused on improving jury
instructions to increase jurors' understanding of the tasks they are asked to
perform.' °° While the merits of some of these reforms may be questionable, there
is little doubt that the goal of jury reform is to address doubts about jurors'
abilities by improving the information and instruction they receive. Those
members of the Court with similar doubts about jurors' abilities seem to have
taken a more drastic approach-cutting the jury out of the process when the risks
presented by poor juror performance are most likely to have serious
consequences. Thus, the members of the Court who mistrust jurors have not
caught up with the reform movement and the extent to which reform measures
may alleviate their concerns.
III. THE REMEDY-MAKING THE GUIDELINES "NON-MANDATORY"

In Booker, the Court acknowledged that the sole reason the Guidelines
implicated the jury trial right was that application of the Guidelines was
mandatory and the Guideline provisions relied on facts never found by the jury in
reaching its verdict." 1 The Booker remedy decision preserves a central role for

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

BMW, 517 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Courselle, supra note 5, at 208-09, 208 n.18.
Id. at 209-10 n.26, 237, 237 nn.166-67.
See supra notes 67-68.
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the Guidelines, without a jury, in the sentencing process. So long as the
Guidelines are not mandatory, district judges can (and indeed must) continue to
apply them and make necessary fact-findings without running afoul of the jury
trial right.0 2
Even before Booker, there was inherent tension within the Sentencing
Reform Act about proper sentencing considerations. Section 3553(a) lists the
Guidelines as one factor, among many, for sentencing courts to consider in
imposing a sentence,' 3 while subsection (b) provides that sentencing courts "shall
impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range" established by the
Guidelines.' 4 Moreover, although § 3553(a)(1) asks the court to consider such
things as the nature and circumstances of the offense and the offender,
subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5) require consideration of the Guidelines and their
policy statements. These, in turn, limit the conduct and characteristics that may
be properly considered under subsection (a)(1). So, pre-Booker, in practice, the
focus of the sentencing courts was almost exclusively on the Guidelines as
directed by subsection (b). The Booker remedy excised the provision of the
Sentencing Reform Act, § 3553(b)(1), that made application of the Guidelines
mandatory.' 5 After this modification, sentencing courts still are "require[d]" to
consider Guidelines ranges,
but are "permit[ted]" to tailor the sentence in light of
0 6
§ 3553(a) considerations.'
Excising alone the provision requiring the application of the Guidelines was
not sufficient to make the Guidelines merely advisory. The provision defining
appellate standards of review, § 3742(e), operated on the assumption that the
Guidelines were mandatory and evaluated sentences in relation to how they
related to the applicable Guidelines.' ° Thus, it too could no longer apply to an
advisory Guidelines regime. Once the standard of review was excised, the Court
had to determine what the controlling standard should be under an advisory
Guidelines regime. The Court's decision was to resurrect the pre-PROTECT Act

102. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-60 (2005).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). This provision asks sentencing courts to consider "the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," id. § 3553(a)(1), the need to
"reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense," id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), deterring criminal conduct, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), protecting the public, id.
§ 3553(a)(2)(C), providing the defendant "with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment," id. § 3553(a)(2)(D), the sentencing range established by the Guidelines, id.
§ 3553(a)(4), Guidelines policy statements, id. § 3553(a)(5), "the need to avoid unwarranted disparities," id.
§ 3553(a)(6), and "the need to provide restitution to any victims," id. § 3553(a)(7).
104. Id. § 3553(b). "Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of the kind,
and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described ..... Id.
§ 3553(b)(1) (emphasis added).
105. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244-47.
106. Id. at 245-47.
107. Id. at 260-61.
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standard' 8 that sentences "outside the applicable Guideline range" be reviewed
for a determination whether they are "unreasonable, having regard for.., the
factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in chapter 227 of this
title. .. ,,o9
In other words, in determining reasonableness post-Booker, appellate
courts are to be guided by the § 3553(a) factors." ' And, the Guidelines are an
important part of § 3553(a): "[D]istrict courts, while not bound to apply the
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.'""
While the remedy decision in Booker may have pushed issues about the
jury's role in sentencing to a back burner, there is reason to believe that these
issues will return to the forefront in the not-too-distant future. Booker makes the
Guidelines "effectively advisory" in name, but in practice, they remain largely
mandatory. Even under the advisory Guidelines regime, district courts, pursuant
to § 3553(a), are not permitted to ignore the Guidelines. And, the "new" standard
of review does more to complicate rather than resolve the problem it was
intended to fix. Even the remedy majority acknowledged that, pre-Booker, the
ability of sentencing courts to depart from the Guidelines made the Guidelines no
less mandatory. ' 2 The "reasonableness" inquiry adopted by the Court as a
substitute for the excised standard of review, however, does little more than
replicate the prior standards for reviewing departures." 3 Post-Booker, the ability
of a sentencing court to depart from the applicable Guidelines seems no more or
less circumscribed than it was before.
IV.

REASONABLENESS REVIEW

The Booker remedy majority expressed confidence that federal appellate4
judges are capable of meaningful application of the "reasonableness" standard."
To date, however, there is no uniform approach to reasonableness review.'1 5 As
one commentator has aptly cautioned:

108. The PROTECT Act (Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-21, § 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. 670), added a de novo standard of review for
departures from the Guidelines. The Court found this addition no longer relevant because the purpose of this
provision of the PROTECT Act was to make the Guidelines even more mandatory. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61.
109. Id.
110. /d.at 261-63.
111. Id. at 263-65 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (5) (2000)) (emphasis added).
112. Id. 256-68.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1083-85 (8th Cir. 2005).
114. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-63.
115. Another issue arising from Booker as to which there is considerable difference of opinion among
the circuits is how to evaluate prejudice arising from a sentence imposed pre-Booker, when reviewed for plain
error post-Booker, based on a mandatory application of the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 398
F.3d 516, 528-30 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing various approaches); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 549
n.7 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing the same). Because that class of cases should soon be extinct, and there has been

2006/Slouching Toward Booker and Beyond
Appellate review of differences from the now-advisory Guidelines range
cannot be exactly what it was before without functionally reintroducing
the former Guidelines system and violating the holding of the Booker
merits majority. Although the courts of appeals may be able to come
close to the old system by setting common law appellate benchmarks for
reasonable sentences, it is possible that this, too, would contravene
Booker."16
Some federal appellate courts have taken an approach to the "reasonableness"
inquiry that implicates these very concerns.
While most appellate courts purport to acknowledge that the Guidelines, as
modified in Booker, give added importance to the other § 3553(a) factors".7 that
had not been routinely applied before in practice, their "reasonableness" review
has rendered those other factors of little importance."' Nearly every appellate
court begins its determination of reasonableness with an inquiry into whether the
Guidelines were properly applied.''
Even post-Booker, misapplication of the Guidelines remains a ground to
consider a sentence improper, without regard to the other § 3553(a) factors.'20
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has held that "[t]he duty to remand all sentences
imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines exists
independently of whether we would find the resulting sentence reasonable under
the standard of review announced in Booker.""'2 Courts have also held that when
considering a "departure" from the non-mandatory Guidelines range, the district
no definitive resolution as to the proper approach, discussion of those various approaches is of little aid to how
the courts do or should conduct reasonableness review.
116. Steven V. Chanenson, Guidance From Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 180 (2005)
(citing Susan R. Klein, The Return of FederalJudicialDiscretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV.
693, 715-16 nn.l 15-17 (2005)); see also David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi,
Blakely and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163, 184 (2005).
117. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d
540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 304 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lake,
419 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 498 (8th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Henderson, J., concurring); United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373,
84 (6th Cir. 2005).
118. See United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[Nlothing in Booker
require[s] the [district] court to determine the sentence in any manner other than the way the sentence would
have been determined pre-Booker.").
119. United States v. Sitting Bear, 436 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Crawford, 407
U.S. 1174, 1178 (1Ilth
Cir. 2005); Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111-12; United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727,
738 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Haack, 403 F.3d at 1002-03; Hughes, 410 F.3d at 546, 556; United States v.
Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 907 n.14 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511,518 (5th Cir. 2005);
United State v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 263-65.
120. See Crawford, 408 F.3d at 1178; United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 310 (6th Cir. 2005);
Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1015, 1017; Mathijssen, 406 F.3d at 498; Price, 409 F.3d at 442; United States v. Scott,
405 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 360 (5th Cir, 2005). see also 18
U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1); cf Mares, 402 F.2d at 519 ("The Guideline range should be determined in the same
manner as before Booker/FanFan.").
121. Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1015.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37

court must consider and apply the Guidelines' provisions related to departures
before looking to the other § 3553(a) factors. 22 Just as incorrect application of the
Guidelines may warrant reversal, some courts have suggested that a sentence
imposed within the correctly calculated applicable range of the supposedly nonmandatory Guidelines warrants heightened deference. 23 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that a pre-Booker sentence within
the Guidelines range is "presumptively reasonable."'' 24 Each of these approaches,
particularly the last, elevate the importance of the Guidelines over other
§ 3553(a) factors,12 in effect reaching something dangerously close to a
mandatory requirement. If the sentencing judge acts unreasonably by not
applying the Guidelines in determining the sentence to impose, or is
unreasonable if she does not adequately justify departure from that range, then
the Guidelines are the most important baseline and they inch closer to becoming
mandatory. Under such a scenario, the Sixth Amendment jury trial right may be
implicated as it was in Booker.
Post-Booker cases have reinforced that sentencing judges retain the ability
"to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the

122. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111-12 n.9; United States v. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 n.2, 939 n.5
(10th Cir. 2005); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 304-05 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)(2), requiring explanations for departures from the Guidelines, survived the remedy majority opinion);
cf.Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546 ("If the court imposes a sentence outside the guideline range, it should explain its
reasons for doing so."); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 480 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Under the new
sentencing regime the judge must justify departing from the guidelines, and the justification has to be
reasonable.")
123. See Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 ("If the sentencing judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence
within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness review we will infer that the judge has
considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines. Given the deference due the sentencing
judge's discretion under the Booker/FanFan regime, it will be rare for a reviewing court to say such a sentence
is 'unreasonable."'); Webb, 403 F.3d at 386 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("I question
whether a sentence within the Guidelines' range can ever be anything other than reasonable in light of the
Sentencing Commission's congressionally mandated mission to develop appropriate sentences based on all
factors related to the conviction."). But see Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115 (declining to adopt a per se reasonableness
rule for sentences within the Guideline range, or a per se unreasonableness rule for sentences outside it, because
"such per se rules would risk being invalidated as contrary to... Booker/FanFan, because they would
effectively re-institute mandatory adherence to the Guidelines"); Webb, 403 F.3d at 385 n.9 (suggesting a per se
reasonableness rule would effectively make the Guidelines mandatory).
124. See United States v. Green, 435 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d
551, 555 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) ; United States v. Kristl,
437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2005). But see United States v. Jiminez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514 (1st Cir. 2006) (en
banc); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir.
2006); Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005). The Eleventh Circuit has not used the "presumptively reasonable"
language, but has stated that "ordinarily, we would expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
reasonable." United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 787 (11 th Cir. 2005).
125. See United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[A]lthough the Guidelines are listed as
only one of the § 3553(a) factors, they are not just one factor among many .... [They] are an expression of
popular political will about sentencing that is entitled to due consideration when we determine
reasonableness."). But see Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113 (declining to define the weight a sentencing judge should
give the applicable Guidelines range).
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determination of a Guidelines sentencing range and all facts relevant to the
determination of a non-Guidelines sentence.' '0 26 Indeed, when determining
sentencing facts for purposes of non-mandatory Guidelines applications,
sentencing courts are not bound by the juries' determinations made under the
reasonable doubt standard.' 27 If the facts sentencing courts are permitted to find
are associated with Guidelines that must be applied, then the resulting sentences
imposed are not based on facts necessary to the jury's verdict or admitted by the
defendant and they implicate the Booker merits decision.
The Court has yet to grant certiorariin any case calling upon it to resolve the
differences among the circuits as to what, as a matter of substance and procedure,
makes a post-Booker sentence reasonable.2 Given the vast array of approaches
taken to resolving these issues, the time will soon come when the Court will have
to step in and provide some guidance. When it does, it will again be confronted
with whether these nominally non-mandatory Guidelines run afoul of the jury
trial right.
In resolving that question, the Court will have to confront head-on its
ambivalence about juries. It also may require members of the Court to consider
whether their doubts about jurors continue to be valid in light of recent jury
reforms. To some degree, however, the Justices' various opinions about the
competence and abilities of lay jurors ought to be beside the point. The Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial makes jurors an indispensable part of the
criminal justice system, whether the Court likes them or not. What is not so clear,
however, is whether Congress or state legislatures have enough trust in juries to
give them a role in the sentencing process.
The road to Booker was neither direct, nor well-paved. But, it has provided
valuable opportunities to think critically about what the goals of sentencing
should be. At the heart of our evaluation of sentencing processes are the
competing interests reflected in the two Booker majority opinions. The Booker
merits majority addresses sentencing that is based almost exclusively on
historical facts; the remedy majority seeks to retain some degree of judicial
sentencing discretion. Somewhere in the middle may be a sentencing regime that
gives both juries and judges important roles in the sentencing process.

126. Mares, 402 F.2d at 518-19; see also Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113 (stating that post-Booker, a sentencing
judge may make all fact findings "appropriate for determining either a Guidelines sentence or a non-Guidelines
sentence); Mashek, 406 F.3d at 1017 n.7 ("Based on the surviving provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, we
believe the better approach is for the district court to continue to calculate the appropriate guidelines range by
resolving all relevant factual disputes, even in complex cases, and for this court to continue to defer to those
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.").
127. United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 685 (10th Cir. 2005).
128. The Court's decision to grant certiorari in Cunningham v. California, 126 S.Ct. 1329 (2006), may
give the court a chance to resolve some post-Booker confusion. See Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas,
Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37 (2006). But Cunningham does not address the disarray
regarding how federal appellate courts should conduct reasonableness review.

